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TAKEOVER REGULATION: THROUGH THE
REGULATORY LOOKING GLASS
Blanaid Clarke*

I. INTRODUCTION
As the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing
Corporate Governance in the European Union (2003) makes clear, the EU
has sought to develop company and securities law as vital pillars of an
overall attempt to improve Europe’s international competitiveness.1 An
important part of this is the creation of an integrated capital market in the
EU. The regulation of takeover bids was deemed to be a key element of
such an integrated market.2 This paper will focus on Directive 2004/25/EC
on Takeover Bids3 and will seek to examine it under the regulatory
microscope. It is too early to make a complete judgment about the
Directive’s effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism as this would involve
determining whether it achieves its goals, secures high levels of
compliance from Member States and market participants and is
democratically accountable to the extent that its provisions affect the

*

Law School, University College Dublin.

1

Commission Communication. Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate
Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, COM/2003/0284 final.
2

Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids, p.18.
3

This is the primary form of regulation of takeovers at EU level although clearly each of
the Market Abuse, Prospectus and Transparency Directives will have implications for the
regulation of takeovers.
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public interest.4 It is however possible to reflect upon some of its potential
strengths and failings in respect of these criteria.
A number of factors must be identified at the outset which affect the shape
of European takeover regulation. Firstly, each takeover is different
because each company is different. Secondly, each market is different in
terms of ownership patterns, structure and stage of development of the
securities market, availability of finance, importance and role of the
banking sector, socio-economic influences and political cultures. Thirdly,
the regulation of takeovers falls within the remit of different types of
bodies in different Member States each with their own particular
structures, agendas, experiences and powers. Finally, takeover law in itself
is not a coherent body of law in the way that one might describe
constitutional or tort law. It has lots of different areas feeding into it such
as company law, securities law, contract law and employment law. From a
regulatory perspective thus it might be said to be more permeable, more
open to external change than other areas of private law.5On the other hand,
these differences have led to diverse treatment of takeovers in different
Member States. A central regulatory problem thus is to determine the
optimal balance between harmonization and diversity.
In the 1970s, a view emerged in Europe that since takeovers had an overall
positive economic effect, harmonised European legislation was required to
facilitate takeovers and to provide a level playing field for takeover bids.
Despite the introduction in 1985 of a White Paper on Completing the
Internal Market which announced an intention to propose a directive on
the approximation of Member States’ regulations governing takeovers,
almost 20 years passed before a directive was actually adopted. During
this time the Commission put forward one proposal after another, all of
which failed to yield a consensus. The first proposal in 1989 involved a
very detailed set of rules to be complied with by Member States. The
second proposal in 1996 took the form of a framework directive setting
4

5

Regulating Law, Parker C, Scott C, Lacey N, Braithwaite J (eds, Oxford, 2004) p.13.

A similar argument was made by Dewar in relation to family law at p.82 of Regulating
Law, Parker C, Scott C, Lacey N, Braithwaite J (eds, Oxford, 2004).
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out general principles governing takeovers bids but allowing Member
States and competent authorities greater scope to deal with the detailed
implementation of those principles. Still the process was beset with
disagreement about the viability of self-regulatory supervisory authorities,
the necessity of mandatory general bids, the treatment of employees
during a bid and the possibility of defensive actions. In 2001, the
Conciliation Committee actually reached a common agreed position6 but
the text was rejected by the European Parliament on a tied vote. At that
time, the Parliament identified for specific criticism the principle that
shareholder approval was required before directors could institute
defensive measures in the face of a bid. The Rapporteur, Klaus-Heiner
Lehne, recommended that such a requirement could only be justified if a
level playing field existed for European companies facing a takeover bid
and that since this was not then the case the agreement should be rejected.
The Parliament also argued that the protection for employees of
companies involved in the bid was insufficient and that the proposal failed
to achieve a level playing field with the United States. Following this
setback, the Commission established a High Level Group of Company
Law Experts under the chairmanship of Jap Winter to present
recommendations for resolving the matters raised by Parliament. The
ensuing report (“the Winter Report” was published in early 2002.7 A
further proposal for a Directive was introduced in 2002 taking broad
account of the Winter Report’s recommendations and following
significant amendment, much of it last minute, a text was agreed.
Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids (“the Directive”) was finally
adopted in April 2004 with a required implementation date of 20 May
2006.

6

7

[2001] OJ C23/1.

Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover
Bids
(2002)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm viewed 9
January 2007.
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II. REGULATORY CHANGES
When a directive was first considered, few European countries had
detailed rules regulating takeovers. Levels of takeover activity varied
dramatically from one Member State to another with the United Kingdom
experiencing a substantially greater number of takeovers, particularly
hostile takeovers, than other Member States.8 Consequently, the United
Kingdom’s City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the City Code) was one
of the first regulatory systems to be introduced in 1968. This selfregulatory code, and the London Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the
London Panel) which implements it, were created in response to public
criticism of the tactics of bidders and targets in a number of prominent bid
battles.9 Since then the London Panel has supervised over 7,000
announced bids. It is clear that the London Panel’s experience and
expertise has been harnessed by the Commission as many of the features
of the Directive such as mandatory bids, the General Principles and the
prohibition on frustrating tactics are modelled on the City Code. By
contrast, many EU Member States had only recently adopted regulations
governing takeovers. Indeed, many of the provisions in these more recent
pieces of national legislation reflect responses to issues being debated in
the context of the Directive. For example, Germany’s Takeover Act was
introduced in 2002 and contained a mandatory bid rule. Prior to that time,
Germany had been a staunch opponent of the inclusion of a mandatory bid
rule in any Directive. This is consistent with the findings of Goergen et al
that many countries have individually undertaken steps towards the
convergence of takeover regulation.10
8

McCahery J, Renneboog L, Ritter P and Haller S, “The Economics of the Proposed
European Takeover Directive” in Ferrarini G, Hopt K, Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds),
Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford, 2004).
9

Weinberg & Blank on Takeovers and Mergers (Sweet & Maxwell), Part III B at
para.3.502.
10

Goergen, Marc, Martynova, Marina and Renneboog, Luc, "Corporate Governance
Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms" (April 2005). ECGI - Law
Working Paper No. 33/2005 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023 or
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.709023.
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The substantial nature of the changes required to be made by Member
States in order to implement the Directive varied from Member State to
Member State. In Ireland, a statutory regime was already in place under
the Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997 which established the Irish Takeover
Panel as the relevant supervisory authority for takeovers of Irish listed
companies. (This role had been exercised until then by the London Panel.
A decision was taken at the time of the split that despite the attractions of
a self regulatory system, in order to ensure compliance with an Irish
Panel’s takeover rules and enforcement of its rulings, statutory powers
were required. 11) The Directive was implemented into Irish law by the
European Communities (Takeover Bids (Directive 2004/25/EC))
Regulations 2006.12
Somewhat ironically, the UK Government found itself faced with a
complicated regulatory dilemma involving the London Panel. During the
earlier stages of the drafting process, it was believed that the UK would be
able to retain its self-regulatory system and thus references are made in the
Directive to harmonising “arrangements” as well as regulations and
codes.13 Recital 7 refers to self-regulatory bodies being able to exercise
supervision. Article 4.1 expressly states that the authorities appointed by
Member States to supervise bids may be public authorities, associations or
private bodies recognised by national law or by public authorities
expressly empowered for that purpose by national law. The UK
Government expressly acknowledged the considerable strengths of the
system of takeover regulation overseen by the Panel, including: flexibility,
11

Clarke,B “The Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997 – A Further Cutting of the UK
Regulatory Ties” (1998) 1 Palmer’s In Company 1-3.

12

The Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2006
subsequently introduced a number of amendments to the 1997 Act and the Regulations
including a provision allowing the Irish Panel to make provision in its rules to give effect
to EU law in this area. The power to make rules in the 1997 Act was not wide enough to
enable the Panel to make rules directly to give effect to changes in this area arising from
the Takeovers Directive and recent caselaw provides that such power must be provided in
primary law.

13

Article 1(1).
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speed and certainty in decision-making; principles-based regulation;
involvement of key City and business participants in developing takeover
rules and the regulatory framework; and a consensual approach to
regulation amongst those involved in the markets.14 It expressed the wish
to preserve these core characteristics of takeover regulation. However,
under Community law, the provisions of the Directive had to be
implemented by rules which have legally binding effect in some way.15
There was considerable legal uncertainty as to whether recognition of a
non-statutory Code as applied by a non-statutory body even with the backup of the Listing Rules or other statutory support would constitute proper
implementation of the Directive. The UK Government thus decided to
provide statutory underpinning to the regulatory activities of the London
Panel while seeking to give it considerable scope to decide its internal
structures and operational framework.16 The City Code was given statutory
effect in the Takeovers Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations
2006 and subsequently the Companies Act 2006. The London Panel was
given a number of statutory powers enabling it to make and enforce rules
in relation to takeover regulation. Interestingly, the London Panel
indicated that in giving its rulings, it continues to have the ability to
interpret the City Code flexibly to take account of the particular
circumstances of the case and that the Executive remains able to respond
to such enquiries speedily.17 Indeed, it has opined that the implementation
of the Directive will have little impact in practice on the Executive’s dayto-day operations.18 Despite the attempts in the Directive to imbue
14

DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, A
Consultative Document (January 2005) para.2.11.

15

DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, A
Consultative Document (January 2005) para.2.12.

16

DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids,
Government Response and Summary of Responses to the Consultative Document
(November 2005) p.3.

17

The Takeover Panel, The European Directive on Takeover Bids (2005/10) (January
2005) p 2.

18

Takeover Panel 2006 Annual Report.
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Member States with as much flexibility as possible by setting out merely
the regulatory framework (described in the next section below), it is
submitted that this may be a sanguine view. The London Panel has always
had the benefit of applying the principle that the spirit as well as, or in
some cases rather than, the letter of the law must be applied. Despite being
subject to judicial review19 and falling within the scope of the Human
Rights Act 1998, the London Panel has not yet experienced the restrictions
which by definition must apply to a statutory code. It remains to be seen
the extent to which this impedes its operation.

III. FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE
The Directive takes the form of a framework of six general principles with
which Member States must ensure compliance. The Directive then sets out
a number of general requirements which Member States will have to
respect through detailed implementing rules. (This is consistent with the
Lamfalussey Report on the Regulation of Securities Markets.20) However,
even these provisions of the Directive must be seen merely as minimum
requirements for EU takeover regulation as Article 3(2) expressly
authorises Member States to lay down additional conditions and
provisions more onerous than those of the Directive for the regulation of
bids.
Recital 6 expressly states that “in order to be effective, takeover regulation
should be flexible and capable of dealing with new circumstances as they
arise”. It states that it should accordingly provide for the possibility of
exceptions and derogations. Article 4(5) thus allows Member States to
provide in the rules introduced pursuant to the Directive for derogations
19

R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc and another (Norton Opax
plc and another intervening) [1987] 1 All ER 564.

20

The Committee of Wise Men Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets
(2001)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm
viewed 9th January 2006. The Committee was chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy.
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from the rules. This power is not however absolute. Firstly, Article 4(5)
clearly states that they may only do so where the general principles are
respected. Secondly, the right to derogate must be provided for in the rules
Member States introduce or make21 and not merely granted by the
supervisory authorities on an ad hoc basis. What remains somewhat of a
moot point is whether derogations can be granted from the general
requirements which are set out in the Directive once to do so would not be
contrary to the general principles.
Although the rationale for harmonising only the basic principles is
obvious, one predictable and intended consequence is that that takeover
regulation will be different in each Member State. Thus for example the
Directive does not define “control” and it is up to each Member State to
state the particular percentage figure. This takes into account differences
in share ownerships structures among Member States. The optionality
provisions referred to in section VI below serve to exacerbate these
regulatory differences. A further and unintended contribution was made to
this regulatory diversity by the drafting process itself. In many areas of the
Directive, Member States are left to attempt to make sense of opaque
provisions or inconsistent provisions. This means that the Directive is
likely to be implemented and construed differently in each Member State,
i.e. according to local legal culture and consistently with prior corporate
law provisions. There are numerous examples of this. One such example is
the requirement to make a mandatory bid which is triggered where a
person as a result of his/her own acquisition or the acquisition of a concert
party acquires control in the company. Article 5(1) requires that “such a
person” must make a bid without specifying which person. In Ireland and
the UK, the pre-existing mandatory bid provision allowed the Panels to
determine which of the parties should make the bid and this practice has
been continued.22 While this provision was maintained in Ireland and the
21

Article 4(4) provides that Member States may (i) include such derogations in their
national rules, in order to take account of circumstances determined at national level
and/or (ii) grant their competent supervisory authorities powers to waive such national
rules, to take account of the circumstances referred to in (i) or in other specific
circumstances, in which case a reasoned decision must be required.

22

Rule 9 of the City Code and the Irish Takeover Panel Takeover Rules 2001-2006.

2007]

TAKEOVER REGULATION

9

UK, different Member States may not follow suit. Furthermore, an
argument could be made that this does not meet the requirements of the
Directive as the obligation is not shared between the parties. Such lack of
clarity can lead to litigation – often of a tactical nature.

IV. CLASSIFICATION
Is the Directive a company law directive or a capital markets directive?
Formally it is a directive on company law and part of the company law
harmonization process. It started life as the draft 13th Company Law
Directive. It deals with company issues such as squeeze out rule and
restrictions on frustrating actions. However, it also seeks to regulate the
information avail to investors making the investment decision to retain
their shares in the company or to sell – a capital markets issue. The
Directive also deals with issues which might be said to be neither
company law or capital markets law such as the provision in Article 6 of
consultation rights to employees. Finally, the Directive deals with issues
with both a company law and a capital markets law dimension. For
example empirical studies indicate that corporate governance is becoming
increasingly important to investors in making their investment decisions.23
Similarly, the SOX legislation in the US indicates that more stringent
corporate governance obligations may often be the capital market
regulatory response to perceived deficiencies.24 Why is this classification
relevant? Although closely linked, capital markets regulation and takeover
regulation serves different objectives.25 For example, disclosure regulation
23

See for example McKinsey’s Global Investor Opinion Survey, 2002 or Gompers, P,
Ishii J and Metrick, A. “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices.” 118 Quarterly Journal
of Economics (2003) 107.

24

“EU Company Law at the Crossroads” at p.12 in Reforming Company and Takeover
Law in Europe (Ferrarrini,G Hopt, K Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds) (Oxford
University Press, 2004).

25

“EU Company Law at the Crossroads” at p.12 in Reforming Company and Takeover
Law in Europe (Ferrarrini,G Hopt, K Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds) (Oxford
University Press, 2004).
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in company law tends to be viewed as an instrument of corporate
governance ensuring that the board is held accountable and allowing their
performance be assessed. It also determines the extent to which a company
can make distributions to shareholders under the capital maintenance
rules. By contrast, disclosure regulations in capital markets law is
designed to ensure the protection of investors by providing them with
sufficient and timely information and the promotion of an efficient and
orderly marketplace. The idea is that by placing a more liquid and efficient
capital market at the service of EU, enterprise will deliver benefits in
terms of competitiveness, and job creation, innovation and growth.26 From
a regulatory perspective, both types of law makes different jurisdictional
claims. The company law of a Member State regulates the governance of
companies incorporated and with their registered offices in the State.
Capital markets law of a Member State applies to companies whose
securities are listed on that State’s markets.
Article 4.2(a) of the Directive provides that the supervisory authority
having jurisdiction to regulate a bid is that of the Member State in which
the offeree company has its registered office (its “home Member State”) if
the securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in that Member
State. In this case, only one supervisory authority has jurisdiction and the
law of that Member State clearly applies to all aspects of the bid. This
provision is likely to apply to the vast majority of companies caught by the
Directive as only a few companies avoid listing in their country of
incorporation. However, where this situation does arise and a company’s
securities are not listed in its home Member State, paragraphs (b) to (e) of
Article 4.2 apply and matters become a good deal more complicated. If the
securities are traded on a regulated market in another Member State, the
competent authority will be that of that Member State. If the securities are
admitted to trading on more than one market, the competent authority will
be that of the Member State on the regulated market of which the
securities were first admitted to trading. If the securities were listed
simultaneously, the offeree company is given the option of determining
which of the Member State’s supervisory authorities will have jurisdiction
and of notifying the regulated market and supervisory authority on the first
26

Report of Sixth meeting of the Financial Service Policy Group (11/02 2000) available
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/actionplan/index_en.htm#policy.
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day of trading. Where its securities are already trading prior to the
implementation of the Directive, the decision is left to the supervisory
authorities. However, in all these cases where the offeree’s securities are
not listed in its home Member State, paragraph (e) provides that
jurisdiction must be divided. Procedural matters which specifically include
the price, the information on the offeror’s decision to make a bid, the
contents of the offer document and disclosure of the bid are to be dealt
with in accordance with the rules of the competent authority’s Member
State. By contrast, both the applicable rules and the competent authority
shall be those of the home Member State for matters relating to
information for employees and company law matters (specifically, the
percentage of voting rights conferring control, derogations from the
mandatory bid and conditions under which defensive actions may be
allowed). Much discussion has revolved around the manner of
implementation of paragraph (e). At one stage during the drafting process,
there were demands for a definitive and exhaustive list within the
Directive of issues falling within each category. Subsequently, it seemed
as if this article might usefully be the subject of Level 2 implementing
measures under the Lamfalussy system. It is now clear that it will be up to
the supervisory authorities in each Member State to agree to a separation
of responsibilities. Two problems exist with this. First, the authorities may
not agree. Second, even if they do, the relevant parties may not accept
what is in fact merely an interpretation of the Directive. The Directive
does not provide a means for resolving such disputes. It merely requires
the supervisory authorities of Member States to “cooperate”. It will thus
fall to the European Court of Justice to do so. All of this will involve time
and delay. This may jeopardise what has been recognised as “the special
needs of the financial markets for speed on the part of decision-makers”.27
It may even encourage tactical litigation. In a hostile takeover bid, one of
the parties may argue that a particular issue, for example a minimum
acceptance condition, has been incorrectly classified. Although as noted
above, paragraph (e) will not apply to the vast majority of Directive
companies at present, concerns have been raised that as European stock

27

R V Panel on Takeovers and Mergers; Ex Parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815.
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exchanges merge and new electronic markets are developed, the number
of companies affected by this provision may grow.28

V. PUBLIC INTEREST
In the light of available economic evidence, the Winter Group opined that
the availability of a mechanism which facilitates takeover bids is basically
beneficial.29 It cited three reasons for this: the exploitation of synergies,
the opportunity to sell at a premium on market price and finally, the
market for corporate control. The latter suggests that takeovers or the
threat of takeovers act as a stimulant to encourage directors to adopt an
optimal governance structure.30 Though beyond the scope of this paper, it
is submitted that the market for corporate control as a form of external
market force suffers from its reliance on a number of disputable
assumptions, limited application and ambiguous empirical support.31
However, the Winter Report was emphatic in its assertion that “such
discipline of management and reallocation of resources is in the long term

28

DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids,
Government Response and Summary of Responses to the Consultative Document
(November 2005) p31.

29

Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids (2002) p.19.

30

Manne H (1965) “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.” 73 Journal of
Political Economics 110, Jensen M and Meckling W “Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial
Economics 305 and Fama E “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) 88
Journal of Political Economics 288.

31

See further Clarke B “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the
Market for Corporate Control” (2006) Journal of Business Law 355-374.
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in the best interests of all stakeholders and society at large” and that these
views “form the basis for the Directive”.32
Prior to the introduction of the Directive in Ireland, the evidence supported
the idea that takeovers were based on the creation of synergies and that
offeree shareholders received premiums but the evidence in support of the
market for corporate control was weaker. A study was undertaken by the
author of all 35 companies subjected to a takeover offer since the
inception of the Irish Takeover Panel in 1997.33 Of the documents studied,
49% involved bids from established companies in the same industries,
36% involved bids by MBO vehicles and a further 15% involved bids by
newly established companies run by individuals often with experience in
these areas. Synergistic gains were stated to be the reason behind the
acquisitions from companies in the same industry. In particular, the
opportunity to expand in the Irish markets was emphasised. Interestingly,
all the cross-border bids in the sample (28%) fell into this category. In
terms of premiums, the average recorded for the bids was 33%.34 This is
clearly attractive for the offeree’s shareholders. It also explains perhaps
why all but one of the companies in the sample experienced a change in
control following the bid. Finally, the evidence sheds some light on the
health of the market for corporate control in Ireland. On a general level,
only 5% of relevant companies were subjected to a bid in any one
year.35In considering which specific bids might be the result of inefficient

32

Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids (2002) p.19.

33

The study was based on the offer documents and response circulars of the 39 takeover
offers made from 1997 to 2006.

34

This does not include offers where there was no actual value for the share listing because of a lack of a market, suspension or otherwise.

35

The average number of relevant companies during the period 1997 to 2005 was 74. The
term “relevant company” is determined in accordance with section 2 of the Irish
Takeover Panel Act 1997.

14

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 05

management, the MBO situations would not appear relevant.36 These bids
were stated to be driven overwhelmingly by perceptions of negative small
cap sentiments in the Irish market. Of the acquisitions from offerors in the
same industry which disclosed these details37, only one involved all the
offeree’s directors resigning and the remaining bids retained the CEO
and/or at least half the board. Of the six bids from new offeror companies
in the sample, one retained the CEO and finance director, four did not
disclose whether any of the directors were resigning and only one declared
that all directors were resigning. None of these companies cited poor
management as the rational for the acquisition. However, before using this
as evidence to question the existence of the market for corporate control,
one must remember that the effect of the market for corporate control lies
as much in the threat it poses to directors as the production of changes in
control. It is arguable thus that where the threat operates effectively, there
would not be high incidents of takeovers. All that one might conclude
from the survey thus is that there does not seem to be substantial evidence
of the stick being used.
While it is clearly in the public interest that the Directive operates
effectively in order to achieve the positive economic effect referred to
above, there is a specific group of stakeholders which is worth considering
separately – employees. Traditionally in Ireland and the UK, takeover
regulation has involved considering the interests of shareholders almost
exclusively amongst other stakeholders. The Takeover Rules referred to
employees only to the extent of requiring the offeror to include a statement
in the offer document indicating: its intentions regarding the continuation
of the business of the offeree and its subsidiaries; its intentions regarding
any major changes to be introduced in the business, including any
redeployment of the fixed assets of the target and its subsidiaries; the longterm commercial justification of the offer; and its intentions with regard to
36

Even if the poor share price was caused by inept management, it would seem to pervert
the market for corporate control theory, if the management themselves were able to
benefit from the fruits of their ineptitude.
37

6 out of the 19 bids did not disclose any details of the resignations. A further one
indicated the finance director and an undisclosed number of other directors were
remaining.
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the continued employment of the employees of the offeree and of its
subsidiaries.38 In practice, this was satisfied by the inclusion of a boilerplate statement to the effect that the employees existing contractual rights
would be respected. Given that this constituted an existing legal
requirement, this was not particularly significant. However, the
continental European idea of corporate social responsibility and the
treatment of employee stakeholders embedded in many of the Member
States political economies would have envisaged a greater role for
employees in the takeover process. Consistent with this, the earlier drafts
of General Principle 3(2)(c) in the Directive imposed a duty on the board
of the offeree “to act in all the interests of the company, including
employment”. The wider and more inclusive form of corporate social
responsibility promulgated in the US never appeared even to reach the
discussion stages in respect of a European Directive.
The issue of employees constitutes a clear example of the challenges faced
by the Commission attempting to find a common path in the field of
takeover regulation. The UK and Ireland expressed concern at the express
reference to employees in the general principles. These concerns did not
stem merely from an unwillingness to compromise positions or parochial
bias. In the common law jurisdictions, genuine legal uncertainty
surrounded the imposition of a duty on directors to act in the interests of
employees. Concern was expressed that this duty might be difficult to
respect where a conflict arose between the interests of the shareholders
and the interests of the employees.39 Such a conflict would arise for
example where a generous offer had been made to shareholders but in
circumstances where the offeror made clear its intention to dismiss a large
portion of the workforce following the acquisition. At the Working
Council Group examining the draft Directive, the argument was made that
in Ireland and the UK, where directors were under an existing fiduciary
duty to act in the interests of the company, this could cause difficulties as
it might be seen as an extension of the fiduciary duties. It was argued
38

39

Rule 24.1.

The Company and Commercial Law Committee of the Law Society of Ireland made
this point for example in their submission to the Commission on the draft directive.
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furthermore that the Directive is charged with protecting shareholders.
This argument was accepted and the final version of the General Principle
3(2)(c) omitted the express reference to employees and refers merely to
requiring the offeree board to act “in the interests of the company as a
whole”.
General Principle 3(2)(c) appears at first glance to amount to a restating of
the traditional common law fiduciary duty. In itself, this would be an
unusual consequence because one of the criticisms often leveled against
EU corporate regulation is that it does not cover core corporate law areas
such as fiduciary duties and shareholder remedies.40 However, the
meaning of the term “company as a whole” remains somewhat ambiguous.
In the common law jurisdictions the term “acting in the interests of the
company” in the context of fiduciary duties has typically been viewed as
acting in the interests of shareholders.41 The term in the Directive is
clearly open to different interpretations and yet none is provided. The
recitals are not helpful in this regard. While the first recital refers to the
necessity to coordinate safeguards required by Member States “for the
protection of the interests of members and others”, the other recitals refer
only to shareholders. Rather than defining the term, Ireland and the UK
have imported the provision directly into the implementing rules. (While,
the London Panel’s Code Committee considers that the Panel’s primary
focus in considering breaches of the Code is and will continue to be the
consequences for shareholders, “on reflection” it noted that breaches of
the Code may also have consequences for other people.42) The lack of a
clear meaning for this term may give rise to difficulties for companies
seeking to comply with this general principle and for Member States eager
to ensure compliance.
40

Enriques L.“EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?”
Law Working Paper N° 39/2005 (May 2005).
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Clarke B, “Regulating Poison Pill Devices” (2004) 4 Journal of Corporate Law Studies
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RS2005/5, Panel Response Statement, 21/04/2006, The implementation of the
Takeovers Directive, p.15.
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A further potential difficulty with the inclusion of this term in the general
principles is that it is not clear whether it gives rise to directly enforceable
rights. While pre-existing companies legislation in the UK and Ireland
acknowledges the duty of directors to act in the interests of employees, the
duty is expressly stated to be owed to the company and enforceable only
by the company.43 However, the Directive imposes an obligation on
Member States to ensure compliance with this general principle without
such a limitation. One might question thus whether the existence of a
general principle in the takeover rules, a narrow statutory duty and a
restrictively interpreted common law duty in Ireland and the UK is
sufficient to ensure compliance with the Directive. From an academic
perspective, one might also consider the effect of such a broad and
unrestricted duty as that included in the Directive on the existing common
law position. Could this perhaps give rise to one of the “collisions” 44
Black describes where the regulatory provisions have direct and unsettling
effect on common law calling into question traditional common law
conceptualisations.
In addition to the General Principle, certain other provisions in the
Directive provides rights to employees. However, these rights constitute
rights to information and to consultation only. So for example, Article
6(3)(i) provides that the offeror must include in the offer document “the
offeror’s intentions with regard to the future business of the offeree
company and, in so far as it is affected by the bid, the offeror company
and with regard to the safeguarding of the jobs of their employees and
management, including any material change in the conditions of
employment, and in particular the offeror’s strategic plans for the two
companies and the likely repercussions on employment and the locations
of the companies’ place of business”. Article 9(5) requires the board of the
43

In some cases such as Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch. 286, Evershed
MR suggested that the interests of the present shareholders should be considered. In
Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health [1972] Ch. 317 and Dawson
International plc v Coats Paton plc (1988) 4 B.C.C. 305 the interests of the company were
equated with the interests of present and future shareholders.

44

Black J. “The Case of Finance” at p.41 in Regulating Law, Parker C, Scott C, Lacey
N, Braithwaite J (eds, Oxford, 2004).
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offeree company to set out its views on the effects of the implementation
of the bid on all the company’s interests and specifically employment, and
on the offeror’s strategic plans for the offeree and the likely repercussions
on employment and the locations of the companies’ place of business as
set out in the offer document”. The Winter Report noted that such
provisions were adequate and that any further concerns for the interests of
employees should be addressed by specific legislation providing for
information and consultation of employees and for their protection in the
event of a bid leading to restructuring.45 Limited though that are, even
these disclosure requirements might be difficult to comply with in all
cases. For example in a hostile bid, the offeror may not have access to
sufficient information to allow it make any meaningful proposals.
Similarly, the offeree board are unlikely to be aware of any substantive
plans. Such difficulties arose in the hostile bid by Ryanair for Aer Lingus
in 2006.

VI. HARMONISATION AND THE CREATION OF A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD
One of the most controversial aspects of the harmonization process in the
takeover market in the EU has been the creation of a level playing field.
Because of the aforementioned structural and regulatory differences
between the various Member States, it was acknowledged that takeover
bids could not be undertaken with the same expectation of success in
different Member States.46 Thus shareholders in Member Sates did not
have equivalent opportunities to tender their shares. This is referred to as
the ‘lack of a level playing field’. The Winter Committee was set the task
of reviewing whether and to what extent a level playing field for takeover
bids could and should be created with respect to the mechanisms and
45

Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids (2002) p.16.

46

Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids (2002) p.19.
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structures, allowed and created under company law in Member States,
which may frustrate or inhibit takeover bids. The Committee
acknowledged at the outset that any approach on this basis would leave the
various general and structural differences existing in Member States
untouched. However it expressed the opinion that its recommendations
with respect to company law mechanisms and structures would, in
addition to market driven changes, mark an important step forward in
developing a general level playing field for takeover bids in the EU.47 The
Report firmly acknowledged that there was a need for a level playing field
for shareholders in the EU and that a directive on takeover bids was an
important part of it.
As a consequence of its deliberations, the Winter Report suggested that a
guiding principle of any European company law regulation aimed at
creating a level playing field should be the right of shareholders to make
the ultimate decision in respect of whether to tender their shares and at
what price. It concluded that the risk was too great that their own selfinterests would lead directors would engage in actions which would
frustrate hostile takeovers.48This view was accepted by the EU legislature
and Article 3(1)(c) provides inter alia that “the board of an offeree
company … must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to
decide on the merits of the bid”. Article 9(2), giving effect to this
principle, requires the specific prior authorisation of shareholders for “any
action ...which may result in the frustration of the bid other than seeking
alternative bids”49 and specifically “before issuing any shares” at least
from the time the offeree is approached. Article 9(3) introduces a
requirement for shareholder approval of “decisions taken … and not yet
partly or fully implemented” before the beginning of the period during
47

Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids (2002) p.20.
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Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids (2002) p 21.
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Such an exemption is also consistent with practice in Ireland and the UK. Indeed in
two of the three hostile bids made to Irish companies during the period of study, this was
the successful form of defence utilised by management.
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which Rule 9(2) applies where the decisions do not form part of the
normal course of the company’s business and where their implementation
“may result in the frustration of the bid”. The prohibition applies to all
decisions which have a chance of frustrating the bid. This appears
extremely far reaching until one considers that Art 9(3) expressly excludes
“decisions” which have been “partly or fully implemented”. Transposing
this particular provision was challenging as no guidance was given as to
what constitutes a “decision” or how one might be partly implemented.50
The difficulty was avoided in the UK and Ireland by the repetition of the
same wording in the Takeover Rules without the benefit of explanatory
notes. This may give rise problems at a later stage when the provision is
tested.
The Winter Report also stated that European company law regulation
aimed at creating a level playing field should be guided by a second
principle – proportionality between risk-bearing and control.51 Article 11
introduces the break-through rule which was designed to increase the
number of takeovers in the EU by eliminating these corporate governance
arrangements which might otherwise impede takeovers.52 The Winter
Report argued that the presence of differentiated voting rights, voting
caps, pyramid structures and other such structures in Member States’
company law was generally inconsistent with the principles of shareholder
decision making and proportionality between risk-bearing capital and
control. The rule’s desired effect thus was to transform a bid on a
company where there is one dominant blockholder into a bid for a
company with dispersed ownership. It allows the bidder thus to acquire
control without necessarily persuading the dominant blockholder to sell.
Article 11(2) and (3) dis-apply certain restrictions when a bid has been
50

Clarke B, “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for
Corporate Control” (2006) Journal of Business Law 355-374.
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made public. During the acceptance period, Art 11(2) dis-applies vis a vis
the offeror restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in the
articles of association of the offeree and restrictions on the transfer of
securities in contracts between the offeree and its shareholders or between
shareholders entered after the adoption of the Directive. Article 11(3)
provides that restrictions on voting rights provided for in the articles of
association of the offeree and restrictions on voting rights in contracts
between the offeree and its shareholders or between shareholders who
entered after the adoption of the Directive shall not have effect at the
general meeting of shareholders “deciding on any defensive measures” in
accordance with Art 9. In addition, Art 11(3) provides that multiple-vote
securities will carry one vote each at the general meeting of shareholders
which “decides on any defensive measures” in accordance with Art 9.
Article 11(4) provides that where following a bid, the offeror holds 75%
or more of the capital carrying voting rights, none of the above restrictions
and none of the “extraordinary rights” of shareholders in the articles of
association concerning the appointment/removal of board members shall
apply. Furthermore, multiple-vote securities will carry one vote each at the
first general meeting of shareholders following closure of the bid, called
by the offeror to amend the articles or appoint/remove directors. The
offeror is entitled to call such a meeting on short notice once at least two
weeks notice is given. Article 11(6) and (7) provides an exception to the
application of Art 11(3) and (4) if the restriction on voting rights is
compensated for by specific pecuniary advantages” or if the rights are held
by Member States. The Winter Report noted that the application of such a
rule after a successful bid was designed to:
strike a balance between, on the one hand, the need, at least for
the time being, to allow differences in the capital and control
structures of companies in view of the current differences
between Member States, and on the other hand, the need to
allow and stimulate successful takeover bids to take place in
order to create an integrated securities market in Europe.53
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As a consequence of the rule, a blockholder who wishes to retain control
must thus compete for the company. In the event that financing is
available thus, the party with the higher valuation will prevail. While
Berglöf and Burkart thus argued that, in the absence of wealth constrains,
the breakthrough rule ensures an efficient allocation of corporate control,54
this view is not without its critics.55 It should be noted that it is possible
that companies could avoid the rule by increasing ownership to more than
25% or reincorporating outside the EU. Alternatively they could introduce
structures outside the scope of the rule such as cross-holdings or pyramids.
Finally, implementing the rule may cause difficulties as a result of the
requirement in the Directive to provide compensation in certain cases.56
This may even allow the rule to be used in order to render takeovers more
unattractive.
In the debates on the Directive in the European Parliament in 2001, the
argument was made that the introduction of a prohibition on frustrating
action would create an unlevel playing field between the EU and the
United States. The Winter Report acknowledged that boards of American
companies generally have a broad discretion to put up defensive devices
under the business judgement rule and that many individual states have
54
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enacted laws specifically permitting the board to consider other interests
than shareholders’ interests. However, it strongly argued that the
American approach was likely to be less beneficial to the development of
efficient integrated capital markets in Europe. It cited three arguments to
support this view. Firstly, while American companies generally have a
broad discretion to defend themselves under the business judgment rule, it
argued that this discretion operates in a widely differing legal and capital
market environment. It suggested that American boards are subject to
greater pressure than their European counterparts to enhance shareholder
value. This pressure comes from non-executive directors on the board,
investment banks and advisors and in particular from institutional
investors. Board behaviour is widely transparent under the legal
transparency rules and the intense scrutiny of the media. In addition, proxy
contests are more likely to ensue and liability suits against directors are
more common as derivative actions are easier and the judicial system is
better equipped. Secondly, the Winter Report noted while the relatively
broad discretion of the board to defend against takeover bids has certainly
led to a number of takeover bids not being successful or not being made at
all, takeover activity in the American capital markets is intensive and
forms an essential part of its financial and economical structure. It noted
that European companies have benefited from this and evidence gathered
on mergers and acquisitions activity between 1990 and 2000 indicates that
the existence of defensive mechanisms have not deterred European
companies. By contrast, the existence of barriers in some Member States
has resulted in control over listed companies being incontestable. The
Winter Report concluded that this is undesirable in the European context,
as an integrated capital market has to be build up in order for business to
fully benefit from and make effective use of the integrating internal
market in Europe. Thirdly, the Winter Report noted that certain defensive
measures in the US are prompted by the ability of bidders to obtain control
through the making of a partial bid. Such bids are not possible under the
mandatory bid provision in the Directive. Finally, it noted that antitakeover rules are controversial even within the United States and that
while some accept them as the outcome of regulatory competition among
the states and effective lobbying by the business community, there is a
large body of both economic and legal literature arguing that they should
be prohibited. The Winter Report argued that it was not desirable that the
American approach to defensive actions be followed in Europe but rather
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a system of regulation which is the best suited to its environment and
objectives.57
Article 12(1) provides that Member States may decide not to require
companies registered in their jurisdiction to apply the prohibition on
frustrating action in Article 9 and the break-through rule in Article 11.
Article 12(2) provides that if Member States “make use of this option”
they must still grant companies the reversible option of applying the
Articles.58 One view is that as a consequence of Article 12(1), the
harmonisation process has been damaged and the goals of the Directive
undermined. An alternative view set out below is that competition is
preferable to harmonisation in this regard. Before dealing with this issue
however, one must consider a more straightforward threat to the creation
of a level playing field and one which is not dealt with by the Directive as
a result of regulatory gaps in this area – the frustration of bids through
persuasion by potentially conflicted offeree directors.

VII. REGULATORY GAPS
A further defence available to the offeree board is that of dissuading the
offeree’s shareholders from accepting the offer. In the Irish survey, this
was the successful form of defence utilised by management in the third
hostile bid. Indeed, it is very telling to note that in all cases in the Irish
study, shareholders followed the advice of their directors. This is
consistent with international empirical studies which have consistently
found that the recommendations of target company directors in takeovers
is the most important variable in determining takeover outcome.59 This
57
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increases the urgency of ensuring that effective corporate governance
mechanisms exist to regulate the process of making these
recommendations in order to ensure that directors are acting in the best
interests of the company and its shareholders. However a mixture of
binding “hard law” and non-binding “soft law” regulates the process of
making these recommendations.
The Winter Report advised that the offeree board’s insight into, and
responsibility for, the strategy and day-to-day affairs of the company
enable and require it to advise the shareholders on the takeover bid. It thus
opined that the board is best placed “to express its views on the
consequences of the bid for the company and its business and on the
attractiveness of the terms of the bid for the shareholders”.60 Consistent
with this view, Article 9(5) of the Directive obliges the offeree board to
draw up and make public a document setting out its opinion of the bid and
the reasons on which it is based. However, absolutely no reference is made
to the composition of the board giving such advice. There is no
requirement, for example for directors with a particular conflict of interest
to stand down. The General Principles merely require that the board of the
offeree “act in the interest of the company as a whole”.61 While this duty
clearly applies to the giving of advice to shareholders, as noted above in
section V, its implementation casts serious doubts on its usefulness in this
regard. The Higgs Report acknowledged the “natural potential for conflict
Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?”(1997) 39 Journal of Financial Economics 343, Holl, P. and Kyriazis, D. “The Determinants of Outcome in UK Takeover Bids”
(1996) 3 International Journal of Economics and Business 165-184, Cotter, JS. And
Zenner, M. “How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process” (1994) 35
Journal of Financial Economics 63-97, Eddey, PH. And Casey, RS. “Directors
Recommendations in Response to Takeover Bids: Do They Act in their Own Interests”
(1989) 14 Australian Journal of Management 1-28 and Walking, R. “Predicting Tender
Offer Success: A Logistic Analysis” (1985) 20 Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 461-478.
60
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between the interests of executive management and shareholders” in the
making of a range of routine decisions such as remuneration or audit.62 In
such circumstances, the Report noted that the legal duty on directors to act
in the best interests of the company in itself is “insufficient to give full
assurance that these potential conflicts will not impair objective board
decision-making”.63 Yet, in the more extreme circumstance of a takeover
bid, only this duty is prescribed by the Directive. It is submitted thus that
by failing to regulate this crucial area of corporate governance, the
Directive is failing in its objective to protect fully the interests of
shareholder and to create a level playing field.
This area is not regulated by existing corporate governance rules. At the
European level, both a Commission sponsored review of the main
corporate governance codes relevant to the EU64 and the High Level
Group of Company Law Experts in its final report65 advised against
establishing an EU corporate governance code. The latter report noted that
while fixed rules in primary legislation may offer “the benefits of
certainty, democratic legitimacy and strong possibilities of enforcement”
this comes at “the cost of little or no flexibility, and disability to keep pace
with changing circumstances.” It specifically recommended making use of
alternative forms of regulation including “soft law” in the corporate
governance area. In the 2003 Action Plan, the Commission agreed that
there was no need for an EU corporate governance code. It did however
emphasise the need for any regulatory response at European Union level
to be firm in the principles as well as flexible in application. As part of this
62
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process, a recommendation on non-executive directors was planned which
considered the nature of board independence. By using a non-binding
instrument, it was intended that Member States would develop their
regulatory environment along similar lines rather than agreeing a single
detailed solution – the process of convergence would thus be flexible.66
The EU Consultation Paper on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory
Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the
(Supervisory) Board in 2004 explained that precise definitions of
“independence” vary in different codes and there is an absence of “a
universal understanding of what independence precisely entails”.67
Similarly, the Recitals to the Recommendation on the Role of NonExecutive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the
Committees of the (Supervisory) Board in 2005 note that “in view of the
complexity of many of the issues at stake, the adoption of detailed binding
rules is not necessarily the most desirable and efficient way of achieving
the objectives pursued.”68 Like other forms of soft law, this leads to
criticism that it lacks the clarity and precision needed to provide
predictability and a reliable framework for action.69
In the absence of an EU corporate governance code, each Member State
deals with this unilaterally. The Combined Code (2006) applies in Ireland,
as in the UK, on a “comply or explain basis” for listed companies. It
provides that the decision as to whether a director is independent “in
character and judgment” rests with the board which must decide whether
there are “relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or
66
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could appear to affect, the director’s judgment”. The Code is not sufficient
to ensure a level playing field. Firstly, the Code may be avoided by a
company merely explaining non-compliance or by adopting its own
definition of the term “independent” or “conflict of interest.” Secondly,
the Code is further weakened by the statement that it is up to the Board
itself to determine what constitutes “independence.” Finally, the provision
in the Code does not apply to specific decision making scenarios. It only
applies to the general board position. What it refers to is independence
from the company, not, for example, independence from a bidder.
Although the EU Recommendation provides for periodic reconfirmation
of independence, 70 it does not provide for reconfirmation on an issue by
issue basis. For this reason, the guidelines pertaining to independence in
the Code and Recommendation might be said to be merely illustrative.
The Irish Takeover Rules states clearly that any director with a conflict of
interest should be excluded from the formulation and communication of
advice to shareholders.71 They provide furthermore that the nature of the
conflict should be explained clearly to the shareholders in any document
issued by the offeree.72 The City Code is less prescriptive merely stating in
that directors with a conflict “should not normally be joined”.73 Even in
such closely aligned Rules as those of the UK and Ireland and in countries
with similar corporate cultures, it is clear thus that a disparity of treatment
of directors is possible. The non-statutory Notes to the Irish Rules give
three examples of circumstances in which a conflict will exit.
Unfortunately, these are not necessarily consistent with the definitions in
the Code. 74 For example, where the director will have an ongoing role in
70
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the new company the takeover rules are more likely to allow the director
advise whereas under the Combined Code a material business relationship
signifies a conflict. The existence of these differences may be positively
unhelpful in the determination of independence in the context of a
takeover Yet this is one of the consequences of operating within a hybrid
system where hard and soft law operate in the same policy domain. The
facets of soft law which appear to make it the appropriate form of
regulation can also lead to significant difficulties in terms of application
and enforcement. A study of the 39 offer documents reveals that while
31% of directors declined to participate in the advisory team, 69% felt
able to give advice to shareholders. In 29% of the bids made, it was
declared that at least some of the advisers would become part of the new
board or become consultants to the newly acquired company. 75 In a
further 29% of the bids, all advisers were expressly stated to have no
further role. However, in the remaining 48% of cases, there was no
disclosure at all as to the future role, if any of the directors. In these cases,
the shareholders did not have the benefit of this information in evaluating
the advice. Clearly, hard rules would be difficult to formulate in relation to
independent directors as in practice “one size does not fit all” and there are
a myriad of different definitions of independence all with different
criteria.76 It is submitted that a description of the nature of independence
could have been set out clearly in the Directive and the relevant
supervisory authorities rather than the board made the final arbiter of
independence. (A somewhat similar treatment is given in the Directive to
the definition of “concert party”.) As things stand, it appears that this
aspect of corporate governance has fallen between two regulatory stools.
This might be said to support a criticism which is often made of soft law
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that it undermines EU legitimacy because it creates expectations but does
not or cannot bring about change.77

VIII. REGULATORY COMPETITION
Viewing takeover regulation through a regulatory lens leads to the
question of whether the effectiveness of the mechanisms could be
improved. As noted above, the Directive is a minimum standards directive
which contains a number of substantive provisions which have been
rendered optional as a result of the inclusion of Article 12(1). The
European Council viewed Article 12(1) as necessary in order to take into
account the existing differences in Member States’ company law
mechanisms and structures. Yet its introduction has led to much
controversy. Commissioner Bolkestein maintained that it would send the
wrong message to the markets. The fact that it was officially reported that
most Member States accepted the final text of the Directive on the basis of
the Rapporteur’s view that “half a loaf is better than none” and the need to
terminate “this never ending story”78 would not have allayed fears that this
was merely an exercise in expediency. A more benign view was taken by
Nilsen who welcomed the compromise as “a good solution which enables
Member States with different types of market economies to preserve their
unique comparative advantages, promoting a more competitive Europe as
a whole”.79 The latter view forms part of a wider debate in the regulation
of European company law concerning the merits of introducing
77
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competition between national corporate law regimes.80 Regulatory
competition implies that national legislatures compete to attract firms to
operate subject to their laws.81 As Collins noted, “in the context of
globalisation and regulatory competition between nation states, national
governments need to be concerned that their laws governing commercial
transactions do not put their economies at a competitive disadvantage,
with the potential deleterious consequence of driving capital investment
and business towards other jurisdictions.”82However, the process of
legislative competition is often criticized as leading to “a race to the
bottom”. In the US, the debate concerning the dynamics of regulatory
competition is most often associated with the case of Delaware. The
argument is often made that because shareholders have insufficient control
over the decision to reincorporate, directors choose a jurisdiction such as
Delaware which facilitates management entrenchment.83 However, the
contrary argument is also made that directors would not engage in action
perceived as detrimental to investors because of fears of a consequential
negative reaction by the capital markets leading to an increase in the
80
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company’s cost of capital. 84 It is said thus that market forces require
directors to choose a beneficial regime and a “race to the top” ensues.85
This brings benefits such as reduced costs, greater expertise and legal
certainty. 86While lessons may be learned from the US, as Deakin pointed
out the Delaware experience is unlikely to be repeated in the EU as the EU
is on a different trajectory reflecting the particular conditions under which
the national systems evolved and under which the harmonization
programme developed.87 Although it was argued that there were
substantive legal and procedural barriers to the establishment of regulatory
competition between EU jurisdictions,88 as a consequence of a number of
European Court of Justice decisions,89 regulatory competition now appears
84
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more likely. A recent survey of international companies incorporating in
the U.K. between 1997 and 2005 indicated a large increase in new
incorporations of limited liability firms from EU Member States following
these decisions.90 The study found that incorporation costs, in particular
minimum capital requirements and delays in incorporation, are significant
influences on location decisions. While many argue that effective
competition takes place on the basis of differences in taxation, labour law
and environmental law rather than company law,91major jurisdictions such
as France and Germany have already instituted reforms to their corporate
law regimes to stem the flow of firm migration particularly to the UK.92
Will competition lead to a race to the bottom or to the top? Deakin
identified “a reflexive approach” to EU corporate regulation which reflects
the differences among Member States’ systems of corporate law in order
to allow for mutual learning processes in the context of European
lawmaking.93 In such a continuing process, the law is thus designed to
underpin and encourage an autonomous processes of adjustment. Deakin
explained that by placing limits on competition “harmonization may aim
to preserve the autonomy and diversity of national legal systems, while at
90
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the same time seeking to steer or channel the process of evolutionary
adaptation of rules at state level”.94 Harmonisation may thus be seen as “a
guarantor of diversity in the laws and practices of different Member
States” and an encouragement of “innovation in forms of self regulation in
the corporate sphere”.95 Forstinger described the process as one under
which “[m]inimum standards are seeking to promote diverse, local-level
approaches to regulatory problems by creating a space for autonomous
solutions to emerge”.96Allowing more choice may thus encourage both EU
and national lawmakers to design value-maximising provisions and, where
there is adequate competition, to engage in innovative lawmaking.97 This
may result in specialisation rather than convergence.98
In the takeover context, Winter noted that the Directive clearly sets the
benchmark of Articles 9 and 11 being applied by Member States and that
hopefully market pressure would provide incentives to adopt this
benchmark.99 However, Vermeulen questioned the likelihood of market94
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induced reform as a result of the strong coalition of interest groups and
other path-dependent forces.100 When the Winter Committee originally
considered whether enforcement of the shareholder decision-making
principle and the proportionality principle might be left to market forces, it
agreed that this might be possible in a fully integrated and well developed
securities market. Such a market would be able to judge correctly the cost
of capital of companies with capital and control structures which deviate
from these principles and alternative investments would be available to
investors. However, the Winter Committee acknowledged that the conflict
of interest of the board might lead to market failure in the principle of
shareholder decision-making. Secondly, it acknowledged that efficient
markets do not exist across Europe. It opined that the securities markets in
Member States differ widely in levels of development and in most
Member States, they would not be able efficiently to judge companies
which do and do not adhere to these two principles. The Winter Report
stated that the more and less developed markets must be integrated on a
European level to enable the restructuring of European industry and the
integration of European securities markets to proceed with reasonable
efficiency and speed. It also noted that investor protection tends to be
weaker in markets where the two principles are not generally followed.
Consequently, in order to establish securities markets in the European
Union which are both efficient and provide an adequate level of investor
protection, the Winter Committee advised that the two principles must be
specified in more detailed rules which are binding in the Member
States.101 Whether the European Parliament’s failure to do so impedes the
ultimate attainment of the Directive’s objectives as the Winter Committee
predicted or whether the balance struck in the Directive between
regulatory competition and harmonization will lead to more efficient
marketplaces remains to be seen. Certainly, the adoption by the majority
of Member States of Article 9 suggests the latter.
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Finally, it should be acknowledged that a new concept in EU company law
was introduced into the regulatory competition debate in the Directive –
reciprocity. Article 12(3) allows Member States “to exempt companies
which apply” the Articles “if they become the subject of an offer launched
by a company which does not apply the same Articles as they do” or a
company controlled by such a company. To do so, however, Article 12(5)
provides that they need the authorisation of their shareholders at a meeting
granted no more than 18 months before the bid. The concept of reciprocity
seeks to encourage companies to move to a more liberal regime
voluntarily by allowing them the benefit of such a regime where they are
the offeror in a takeover bid. It is also notable that the provision was
introduced in the context of concerns that the Directive would not create a
level playing field between the EU and the United States. It was felt that
the Directive would restrict EU companies defending themselves against
bids in circumstances where their United States counterparts might not be
so limited.102 The inclusion of a reciprocity provision runs contrary to the
idea that the location or openness to takeover of the offeror is irrelevant
and that what should be considered is the location of the offeree. It is
argued that reciprocity in takeovers unduly restricts the group of potential
offerors to listed companies that are themselves open to hostile bids
creating a “fortress Europe” vista and that it reduces the potential benefits
of contestable control.103 From a theoretical perspective, this limitation is
in conflict with the declared aim of protecting the minority shareholders of
the offeree. As the empirical evidence suggests that multiple offerors are
associated with higher premiums for offeree shareholders, reciprocity is
likely to penalise the minority shareholders the Directive seeks to protect
in circumstances where it not essential in addressing fairness concerns. In
addition, it may be difficult to reconcile this provision with the freedom of
102
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establishment and free movement of capital under EU law which do not
impose any condition on the party wishing to enjoy rights under national
company laws other than having the registered office or central
administration in a Member State.104 In allowing national discrimination,
it may also be contrary to the “Most Favoured Nation” principle. The
majority of Member States including Ireland and the UK have chosen not
to adopt this Article. What is likely, however, is that the first company in a
Member State allowing it that seeks to take advantage of it in the context
of a hostile bid will be the subject of legal challenge in the European Court
of Justice.

IX. CONCLUSION
Commissioner Bolkestein criticised the final draft of the Directive stating
that he was not going to “[pretend] that the version of the Directive agreed
today represents a step forward for EU competitiveness or for the
integration of EU capital markets”.105 The Chairman of the London Panel
Peter Scott was equally negative stating that the Directive “is hardly a
triumph for harmonisation since the contentious areas remain a matter for
Member States to decide for themselves.” Whether this could have been
avoided is a moot point and as noted above benefits may well be derived
from the ensuing regulatory competition. The Directive has also been seen
to be the source of a number of new problems for Member States already
in possession of the minimum standards. For the United Kingdom and
Ireland, the Directive brings little in the form of additional safeguards or
benefits to an already robust and effective system. The UK Government
and the London Panel have expressly stated that the Directive will not
yield any significant improvement to the principles or methods by which
takeovers and mergers are conducted in the United Kingdom under the
City Code.106 The UK Government also recognised that the Directive
104
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might give rise to “an increased risk of litigation within the bid process,
which could have the effect of delaying or frustrating a takeover bid and
hindering the opportunity for shareholders to decide upon its merits.”107 It
is difficult to argue that his unequal exchange can result from an efficient
regulatory approach. While this might seem at first glance merely one
State’s problem, the prominence of the UK securities market and takeover
market make this a more significant general concern. Supervisory
authorities also face new challenges in interpreting certain of the
Directive’s more opaque provisions. As the paper has shown, in many
cases this will lead to uncertainty, delays in timetables and increased
litigation. Finally, the Directive can also be criticized for its failure to
tackle certain issues which though dismissed as corporate governance
matters have a real impact on the likelihood of bids being made and
accepted.
On a more positive note, the Directive might be viewed as a step forward
through laying down minimum standards for takeover regulation and
applying many of the core values of the UK system at the EU level.108 It
might be said “to put a floor to the race to the bottom”.109 The UK
Government acknowledged that it opened up the prospect of “improved
shareholder protection and access to capital markets across Europe and a
potential stimulus for more transparent corporate governance structures
with extended shareholder involvement.”110 If implemented in accordance
with its own General Principles, it could encourage cross-border takeover
107
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activity with consequential improvements in corporate management.111
This clearly would be in the public interest. For new accession States,
perhaps it could be argued that the Directive gives guidance and provides
a useful structure on which to build national takeover regulatory systems
appropriate for the EU market. However, it should be noted that a
Directive might not have been necessary to provide this. For example,
both Ireland and Austria successfully introduced national takeover
regulations based very heavily on the City Code and with the advice of the
London Panel. Enriques cites this as a general complaint against EU
company law - that often when it has introduced new rules, it has done so
with respect to issues on which Member States would have most probably
legislated even in the absence of an EC mandate.
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